When a Soldier Commits Suicide in Iraq:
Impact on Unit and Caregivers Russell B. Carr, M.D.
There have been studies about the impact of a suicide on family members and friends, but none to date on a military unit in a combat zone. This is the first description, to my knowledge, of the effects of the suicide of a U.S. Army soldier deployed to Iraq. A narrative from the treating psychiatrist's perspective describes both the acute and longer-term (four months) effects of the suicide on members of the soldier's unit, other soldiers at the same base, members of the medical team who attempted to resuscitate him, and mental health care providers. This account describes how the suicide affected at least thirteen other soldiers on the base. The effects of the soldier's suicide showed a few similarities to those described in the literature, including stigmatization of the survivors and the stress experienced by the mental health providers. There were additional repercussions that have not been previously described, including the impact on the soldier's peers within his unit and other soldiers on the base, the need for medical evacuation from Iraq of soldiers following the event, and the reported stress on the medical staff due to the attempted resuscitation of someone known to them. Future research is needed to understand the impact of a suicide on the survivors in a deployed military setting and to establish best practices for postvention strategies.
In his classic text on suicide, Shneidman established the idea that for every suicide, six people are affected (Shneidman, 1969) . A case of suicide is presented here in which the number is much higher. In military settings, particularly in a combat environment, the lives of a unit's members are interdependent. In the U.S. Army, a company can consist of about one hundred soldiers. They train together for months prior to a deployment and then live with each other in close contact for a year or more when deployed to a combat zone. Such a lifestyle can foster lifelong friendships. Therefore, a suicide within a company can affect all of its members as well as those in surrounding units. Unfor-tunately, at the beginning of 2009, the U.S. Army revealed that suicides in 2008 reached their highest point in twenty years and occurred at a rate comparable to that in the civilian population ("Army to report," 2009). This situation in the military, along with the prolonged deployment of troops in support of campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan, points to a need to understand the effects of suicide within a combat zone.
Described here are the events following one of the suicides of an American soldier in Iraq in 2008. I was the soldier's treating psychiatrist in Iraq, and I have written this account from my perspective. As far as I know, this is the first description of the aftermath of a suicide within a combat zone in the scientific literature. As will be illustrated, a suicide can have a profound effect on the soldier's immediate unit, members of other units on the base (approximately 4,000 military personnel were living on the base), the medical personnel who respond, and also the mental health providers (Combat Stress Control unit) on base in such an environment. This account describes at least thirteen soldiers affected by the suicide, not including the Combat Stress Control (CSC) team, a number that is well beyond Shneidman's six.
On this base in Iraq, the CSC team consisted of one psychiatrist (the author), two social workers, and three enlisted mental health specialists. This team was actually part of a larger Combat Stress Control unit scattered across several bases in Iraq. At that time, the Army had several such units in Iraq, providing mental health assessment and treatment. CSC units are divided into Prevention and Fitness teams. The team described in this article is a Prevention team. These teams have evolved over the years to provide direct mental health outreach to soldiers in combat. In conventional wars, they would work on the "front lines," visiting units and providing direct support to soldiers where they lived and fought. In contrast, Fitness teams evolved to provide a site for a brief respite for soldiers suffering "combat fatigue," a few miles away from the front lines but still close to units. In an anti-insurgency campaign, such as Operation Iraqi Freedom, the missions of both of these teams evolved to match the problems seen in an unconventional combat environment. Many of these problems still included the effects of combat, such as acute stress reaction and post traumatic stress disorder, but in Iraq there was greater emphasis on depression, chronic insomnia, interpersonal problems within units, and marital problems due to multiple deployments. CSC teams provide care on an outpatient basis, either on smaller bases or in a clinic setting. There were no inpatient psychiatric wards for military personnel in Iraq. If a soldier warranted psychiatric hospitalization, he/she had to be medically evacuated to Germany. This process could take days to a week or more, depending on the availability of flights and the weather. In the meantime, the soldier's weapon would be taken or made inoperable (completely taking the weapon contributes to stigma and shame), and he or she would be placed on a "unit watch," with the unit assigning other soldiers to maintain a close watch at all times.
Although the literature does not explicitly address suicides in a combat zone, existing research on postvention for survivors of suicide might offer pertinent insights for supporting soldiers who must continue to operate as a cohesive unit after one of their peers commits suicide. This case also illuminates additional areas for research that will be increasingly important as deployment of American Armed Forces continues.
A SoldIer'S SUICIde
A U.S. Army soldier in a non-infantry job killed himself in his living space after lunch one day. He was a few months into a fifteen-month deployment to Iraq. Several soldiers in the area responded to the sound of his weapon firing. An ambulance from the base Troop Medical Clinic transported him back to the medical clinic to resuscitate him.
He was then immediately air-evacuated to a Combat Support Hospital about 30 miles away, where he was pronounced dead.
The members of the CSC team on base had just returned to their offices after lunch. I was discussing another soldier's risk for suicide with a company commander when we heard the ambulance leaving the nearby medical clinic. The other team members and I quickly learned where the ambulance was going and that a soldier had attempted suicide. Over the next thirty minutes, the staff learned that the soldier had shot himself in the chest and pronounced dead. I then learned the soldier's identity and realized that I had seen him for depression weekly for the three weeks leading up to his suicide. He had been diagnosed with major depressive disorder, single episode, moderate. At our first meeting, he agreed to take fluoxetine for depression and trazodone for insomnia, and he agreed to attend an anger management group at the CSC clinic. Although he acknowledged fleeting, passive thoughts of suicide without a plan or intent, he insisted he would never act on such thoughts because of his children and religious beliefs. At our third meeting, he had reported that his symptoms were improving some and denied any thoughts of suicide. He arrived late for the anger management group on the day of his suicide, and his fourth appointment was scheduled with me for the day after his suicide.
The emotional reactions that followed the suicide varied among individuals, but were based on four general perspectives: members of his unit, soldiers on base from other units, staff of the Troop Medical Clinic, and the CSC staff. These reactions included guilt, disbelief, anger, shock, and, of course, sadness. On that day, the CSC team focused on providing support to the soldier's unit and the Troop Medical Clinic. All but urgent appointments were cancelled for the afternoon. Walk-in patients from the company were prioritized. The CSC staff formed teams and went to the company's headquarters and to the base medical clinic. This approach was part of the standard needs assessment and clinical services outreach response to combat and other traumatic events. Researchers have described it in many ways, including "walkabouts," and it is part of the standard United States Army procedures for assessing individual and unit needs and delivery of initial care Department of the Army, 2006; Hamaoka, Benedek, Grieger, & Ursano, 2007) eFFeCTS oF THe SUICIde
Acute effects: The Company
The CSC members who went to the soldier's unit found shock and disbelief among the soldiers as well as welcoming responses from the unit's leadership. The company commander, caught between gathering information for his superiors and trying to comfort his troops, sought recommendations on how to discuss the apparent suicide with his soldiers and how to attend to their needs. He informed the CSC members that the soldier had left a suicide note. As part of usual procedures, it had been given to a criminal investigation unit. During this initial brief conversation, the company commander told his unit's senior enlisted leader, the first sergeant, to "keep a close eye" on a soldier who walked by the group and who the commander knew was being treated for PTSD. The commander was fearful of how he might react to the suicide.
The members of the CSC team then entered the company's work areas, talking to soldiers on an informal basis. The various platoons of the company were already gathering to discuss the news. Some of the platoon sergeants asked the CSC members to join the discussion with their soldiers; others requested time to discuss it themselves.
One platoon sergeant said, "I've got this one, Doc," as a way of asking the CSC members not to join the group of soldiers around him. He further explained that he wanted to inform his soldiers about the situation himself before CSC members spoke with them. The CSC kept close contact with the company over the next few weeks.
The following day, the officer in charge of the CSC unit led a Battlemind Psychological Debriefing with the soldiers who responded to the suicide. These debriefings are part of the Army's Traumatic Event Management program for potentially traumatic events, with the goal to "support military personnel in their transition back to duty after a significant incident" (U.S. Army, 2010). These groups are modeled differently from Critical Incident Stress Debriefings, and have three phases "in which combat events or deployment experiences are acknowledged among unit members, common reactions are discussed, and actions that can be taken to facilitate the transition are reviewed" (U.S. Army, 2010). It was a voluntary discussion group, and four soldiers participated. All four expressed disbelief that this particular soldier had committed suicide, and a few of them expressed guilt that they did not prevent it. Of the four, two were encouraged by both their first sergeant and the group leader to seek help at the clinic and they did. Both were experiencing some symptoms consistent with an acute stress reaction, including dissociative episodes, hypervigilence, and insomnia. One reported that he felt exhausted and had not slept since the suicide. Every time he closed his eyes to sleep, he saw the soldier's face as he had found him immediately after the suicide. Both soldiers were given three days of sleep meds, and they were pulled from missions to rest. I saw them again at the end of their three days of rest and then returned them to full duty at their request. They were seen again one week later, at which time they denied having any subsequent problems.
Acute effects: The Troop Medical Clinic
At the Troop Medical Clinic, members of the CSC met with the staff who had attempted to revive the soldier. Some of the more experienced medics described shock at the apparent cause of death but not the blood or other evidence of violence. They were also comforting some of the junior medics who were disturbed by the injury itself in an American soldier. The clinic doctors described the difficult burden of suddenly having to manage the severe trauma of a gunshot wound in the middle of a normal sick call. One physician described his distress at having the soldier's blood on his boots after trying to revive him, and being unable to clean off the blood completely even after several scrubbings.
Acute effects: The Combat Stress Control Team
By the end of the afternoon, the CSC team members described feeling numb and too busy to process their own emotions about the suicide. I too was focused on the work that seemed to have no end that day, using it to keep from focusing on my own confusion and sadness. I also felt distracted, unsure of myself, feeling I was not in a good enough state of mind to try to help others deal with this event. Phone calls from our commander were coming regularly. He requested that an official report on the suicide, which normally is completed within 30 days of the event, be completed by the close of business that day. The team worked together into the early evening to get it done. At the same time, we were receiving calls from senior psychiatrists and other physicians from across Iraq, all offering support but some also asking details about the soldier's care. After an exhausting day, I only began to contemplate the events that night, alone with my sadness in my quarters.
Acute effects: Clinical
Two additional soldiers were seen the following day in the CSC clinic because of the suicide. One of these, a female soldier, had known the victim for several months and was already a patient at the clinic. She had spoken to him the morning he died. She was tearful as she reported that she had chatted with him and that he had discussed his future plans for seeing his family. She reported feeling confused that he had never mentioned his being suicidal to her or even hinted that there was a problem.
The second soldier seen that day was in the same company as the soldier who committed suicide, and he came to the CSC clinic on the encouragement of his first sergeant. He shared his belief that the soldier had not committed suicide, but was instead murdered. He felt so strongly about this that he adamantly voiced plans to find the murderer and "take care of him." The severity and meaning of his loss were discussed with him, as well as stages of mourning a death. His denial of the suicide was never directly challenged, but the provider seeing him wondered if it might be the beginning of a delusional process. He was told that his desire to take care of a potential assailant was worrisome. He agreed not to act on his plans, and follow-up was scheduled for the next day. By the end of the second session the following day, the soldier was willing to accept that it was indeed a suicide.
Two days after the suicide, a soldier from a different unit was referred by his commanding officer who feared he might be suffering from a mental health condition. The soldier was brought to the CSC after expressing homicidal thoughts toward his staff sergeant; he had surrendered his weapon voluntarily to his first sergeant. He described chronic interpersonal problems with his staff sergeant. His anger toward her had escalated after he heard of the suicide. He reported being scared and saddened by the news. He had not known the soldier, but he speculated that he had been pushed too far by a superior. He felt his own staff sergeant was also pushing him to meet excessive performance standards, and was angered that his staff sergeant's attitude toward him seemed to continue even after the suicide. He reported that he felt he "just can't take it anymore." He denied actual desire to harm her. He was placed on a watch for two days, and his anger diminished. His weapon was removed from him for one month, and he entered treatment. He dropped out of treatment after a few sessions, and he did not return for mental health care over the next four months for which followup was known. Reports indicated that he had no further problems with his chain of command.
Over the week that followed the suicide, three soldiers were subsequently airevacuated from Iraq to Germany due to mental health concerns. Although they also had underlying problems, the suicide on base contributed to an acute destabilization of their situations. The first soldier was from the same unit as the soldier who committed suicide. He was the one the company commander pointed out to his first sergeant when the CSC team had visited. This soldier was diagnosed as having PTSD from a previous deployment to Iraq. The soldier had believed returning to theater might improve his symptoms. He felt that once he returned to the country of his prior trauma, he would come to terms with his prior experiences and put them behind him. However, since his return to Iraq his symptoms had only worsened. In the weeks prior to the suicide, this soldier had begun refusing to go on missions and expressed frustration that his treatment at the clinic was not helping his symptoms. He had told his company commander about his PTSD symptoms. His first sergeant reported that the suicide had disturbed him, and expressed concern about his risk of hurting himself or someone else. A few days after the suicide, he was seen in a previously scheduled appointment at the clinic. He appeared very depressed and expressed dismay and anger at the deceased soldier. He said that he too felt that "my back is against the wall." He described anger at his commander and his care providers for his having to remain in theater. After some negotiation with his chain of command, he was air-evacuated out of Iraq to receive intensive treatment for PTSD and alcohol dependence at his home base. A few months after he left Iraq, he was arrested for allegedly beating his wife while intoxicated.
Another evacuated soldier was a female who had been diagnosed with borderline personality disorder prior to her deployment. She had had no interactions with the soldier who killed himself and reported hearing very little about it. However, she had been placed on a suicide watch just a few days before his suicide. Although her suicidal ideation at that time was brief, she had reported a long-standing history of passive suicidal thoughts. Her commander was aware of her mental health issues, and even more so after having to conduct a suicide watch. As a result of the other soldier's suicide, her commander expressed concerns about her remaining in theater and her long-term risk of suicide. A decision was reached between her commander and me to evacuate her from theater due to her long-term risk. Her chain of command had been hesitant to agree to evacuate her earlier, but the suicide on base raised their level of general concern.
The third soldier to be evacuated was a medic involved with the failed resuscitation of the suicide. Prior to the suicide, she was being treated for depression and anxiety about returning home to see her young daughter after a 15-month deployment. She had never previously expressed suicidal thoughts. A few days after the suicide, she sought out a walk-in appointment. She reported a nightmare in which she committed suicide. The nightmare had felt extremely intense, almost real, to her. She also described how disturbing the soldier's suicide had been to her, particularly the blood that poured out of his chest onto the floor. She also felt that he looked so peaceful, and mused that perhaps suicide would put an end to her problems. She felt that she was an inadequate mother to her daughter, and dreaded returning home to her. She was placed on a suicide watch overnight. The next day she admitted to looking for ways to kill herself while being watched (for example, possibly grabbing someone else's weapon). She was evacuated to Landstuhl, Germany, for psychiatric hospitalization since there are no U.S. military psychiatric wards in Iraq.
effects over the Subsequent Four Months: The Company
The soldier's memorial service was held two weeks after the suicide. It was a closed service, with only the soldier's company attending (100 soldiers out of about 4,000 on the base). Who would be allowed to attend was determined at a senior level, well above the company's commander. When the officer in charge of the CSC team asked for its members to attend, both for their own closure and to be available for any soldiers having trouble dealing with it, the request was denied. At the further insistence of the officer in charge, I was allowed to attend the service as his treating psychiatrist. The exclusion of the CSC team was a source of anger and disappointment to the combat stress personnel.
Normally, all military personnel in Iraq are required to have ammunition for their personal weapons on them at all times. However, following the suicide, all soldiers in the suicide victim's company were required to place their ammunition in a storage facility when they were not on missions. It was issued to them just prior to each mission and had to be returned to storage upon return to base. After the suicide, the company's first sergeant frequently came to the CSC clinic, occasionally with a soldier he was encouraging to get help for a problem or to check on soldiers he knew were being seen there. He had already worked closely with the CSC team to make sure the needs of his soldiers were met. The care of those soldiers was only discussed with him after they gave written permission. At other times, he came seeking consultation on how to handle certain situations and unofficially to vent about his own stress. He and the company commander sought more visibility for the CSC team in their unit. In addition to the informal "walk-abouts" that CSC team members routinely did with all units, in which they unofficially chatted with soldiers, the commander requested that CSC hold tobacco cessation groups at his unit's headquarters. Up to ten of their soldiers at a time attended these groups, which gave the combat stress team much more visibility with the unit as a whole.
effects over the Subsequent Four Months: The Combat Stress Control Team
In the weeks following the suicide, the work level for the CSC team greatly intensified. There was an increase in the severity of pathology seen, and, as described earlier, several soldiers were medically evacuated from Iraq. There was also an increase in the administrative burden on the unit. Three inspections occurred over the next month. The commanding officer of the CSC unit came from another base in an effort to better understand the circumstances of the suicide personally as well as to provide support. Then the senior Army psychiatrist in Iraq came to assess the clinic and meet with the staff. For the arrival of each of these senior officers, preparations were made that took time and increased the stress burden on the CSC team. Because of the associated workload, the members of the team did not have much time to process the event for themselves. Finally, a senior psychiatrist came to perform a case review to assess if standards of care were met prior to the soldier's suicide. After thoroughly reviewing records, interviewing his provider and other CSC team members, and interviewing members of the soldier's unit, the senior psychiatrist determined that standard of care had been met in the soldier's treatment.
About ten days after the event, the members of the CSC team sat down and discussed their feelings about it. Although this helped, the work environment for them remained strained for several months. All three of the credentialed providers on the team reported feeling less confident of the decisions they made about treatment plans, ultimately pursuing much more conservative treatment than they normally did, particularly around issues of safety.
A few weeks after the event, concerns about the perception of the CSC unit's functions on base led the CSC's officer in charge to seek meetings with several senior leaders of various commands there. The meetings were positive, as the leaders were quite concerned about suicide risk on base and were seeking ways to help reduce it. Additionally, the senior officer on base was already holding monthly suicide risk-reduction meetings with all the other senior leaders and the combat stress officer in charge. The senior leadership agreed to have all soldiers participate in a new four-hour interactive training program on stress management that the CSC team would conduct. This training was an attempt to address modifiable suicide risk factors. The program had been implemented on other bases in theater, and this tragedy gave the momentum to initiate implementation on this base as well. This, however, added a significant burden to the CSC team to provide training to about 4,000 soldiers in groups of twenty.
effects over the Subsequent Four Months: Clinical
During the four months after the suicide, at least three more soldiers sought help at the CSC to deal with the loss. They frequently expressed guilt that they had failed to anticipate the suicide or stop it. One soldier who came to the clinic almost four months after the event reported worsening depression and persistent nightmares. He described having been very close to the soldier and expressed guilt that he did not stop the suicide. He reported seeing the soldier in his dreams, dreams in which the dead soldier was trying to tell him something but he could not understand his words. After some time, he revealed that the soldier had told him about a week before his death that he was contemplating suicide. He said he had stayed up most of the night talking to him about it and his problems. He then chose not to betray his friend's confidentiality. A few days later, he left for R&R in America, and only later discovered that the soldier had killed himself. He felt that his friend would still be alive if he had told someone.
dISCUSSIon
Although a combat zone differs from the environments depicted in studies on suicide survivors in the literature, there are similarities between the aftermaths of those suicides and the effects this report documents. Stigma is one such area. People dealing with mental disorders suffer stigmatization both in civilian populations (Alonso et al., 2009) and in the military (Hoge et al., 2004) . Just as stigma has been documented for civilian survivors of suicide in the literature (Cvinar, 2005; Sudak, Maxim, & Carpenter, 2008) , authors have also documented it within the military (Hoge et al., 2004) . There was stigma for the survivors in this case. Although there were efforts to support the company following the suicide, the arrangements for the soldier's memorial service created stigma. Those personnel allowed to attend the service were limited, and the treating psychiatrist had to seek specific permission to attend it. Restricting access to the memorial service created a sense of shame about the death and, perhaps, for those who attended it, a sense of needing to be cordoned off from other soldiers. There was also frustration and a sense of disregard among those not allowed to attend but who wanted to be there. One reason given for limiting who attended the service was a desire not to "glorify" the suicide with the larger, standard remembrance ceremony held for soldiers killed in combat.
Another similarity between this report and the literature is the effect of the suicide on the caregivers involved in this soldier's care. As some writers have indicated, there has been relatively little written about the therapist's reaction to the suicide of a patient (Valente, 2003) . Researchers have described initial feelings of shock and denial, followed by shame, guilt, and self-recriminations (Gitlin, 1999) . Providers can also become excessively conservative and self-doubting following such an event, fearing lawsuits or other legal repercussions (Valente, 2003) . The CSC providers involved with this case were not immune to these feelings. In addition to the fear of lawsuits from the family of the deceased soldier, CSC members also underwent scrutiny from their chain of command and other mental health care providers during a case review process. As a unique circumstance of a military environment, the mental health providers who treated the soldier before he committed suicide were the same ones who responded to the needs of his survivors. This situation is common in a military setting and can complicate the bereavement process for the providers: they frequently must set aside their own reactions to a suicide to focus on the soldiers it has affected. All of these circumstances can combine to place unusual stress on deployed mental health care providers, and this raises the need for a strategy to support them following a suicide.
The soldier's suicide also affected the Troop Medical Clinic staff that had attempted to revive him. Although the staff had all seen soldiers severely wounded in combat, many of them had difficulty treating a fellow soldier's intentionally self-inflicted wounds. During discussions with the CSC team immediately after the event, several medics described the shock and sadness they experi-enced treating a soldier upon realizing that he whom many of them knew, had shot himself. The dual role of the medical staff as primary care provider and emergency medical responder is an unusual circumstance that can happen in a remote military environment. In this kind of circumstances the doctors and medics likely know the soldier, and they might recognize during the resuscitation process that the wounds were self-inflicted. Although similar circumstances might arise in remote civilian medical practices, it is not described in the literature to my knowledge.
Research is needed to understand better the traumatization of health care workers in this situation and to determine the best ways to support them following attempted resuscitation of a suicide.
Much future research is needed on the effects of a suicide in the military in a combat environment. One area is the risk of a suicide precipitating additional suicidal behavior and other mental health problems in other military personnel. This report described several soldiers who were seen in the CSC clinic following the suicide who reported suicidal thoughts. Two of these service members could not be treated successfully on base and required medical evacuation from Iraq. The overall intensity of the mental health problems of soldiers who came to the clinic seemed to increase as well following the suicide. In addition to the personal impact, the loss of service members for any reason in a deployed environment can deteriorate a unit's capabilities. Studies are needed to understand this phenomenon of suicidality and mental strain as contagions in order to both anticipate and lessen its impact.
When researchers consider the effects of a suicide on others, they frequently focus on the reactions of first degree relatives, such as parents, children, or spouses (Begley & Quayle, 2007; Henry & Greenfield, 2009; Mitchell, Kim, Prigerson, & MortimerStephens, 2004; Owens, Lambert, Lloyd, & Donovan, 2008) . Some studies have examined the effects of suicide on adolescent peers (King & Merchant, 2008; Melham et al., 2004; Roen, Scourfield, & McDermott, 2008) . Members of a military unit do not neatly compare to any of these groups. They also cannot simply be compared to friends of someone who kills himself. Two studies have described the effects of suicides within military medical systems in the United States Young, Ursano, Bally, & McNeil, 1989) , but deployments create a much more intense experience than almost any routine occupational environment. Future research will need to examine the effects of a suicide on a deployed military unit. Some areas to examine include the forms bereavement takes, the impact of a suicide on a unit's mission readiness, and the sense of stigma among the unit's members following the suicide. One possibility for conducting research in theater is to establish a mobile assessment team that responds to events immediately and both assists with response to a suicide and initiates longitudinal assessments of the survivors.
This report indicates the need for development and testing of postvention strategies for use specifically within military environments. Currently, most support after a suicide within a combat setting comes from the chain of command, fellow soldiers, chaplains, and CSC teams. All of these, except peers, offer both formal and informal methods of support. The CSC response is not specific for a suicide, but instead is based on the standard response to any traumatic event within a military unit (Department of the Army, 2006) . This standard response can include an operationally oriented (e.g., reconstructing the history and events) debriefing, for which there is little research following a suicide. There have been several recent reviews of the research literature on postvention strategies (Andriessen 2009; Andriessen, Beautrais, Grad, Brockmann, & Simkin, 2007; McDaid, Trowman, Golder, Hawton, & Sowden, 2008; Sakinofsky, 2007) . Some studies point to the efficacy of peer support groups for suicide survivors (Sudak et al., 2008) . Additionally, other studies emphasize the need for professional services that are unique for suicide survivors (McMenamy, Jordan, & Mitchell, 2008; Sakinofsky, 2007) . Research on assistance to families after a suicide, for example Worden's goal of restoring internal social structure and communication (Worden, 1991) , might be applicable to a military setting. Additionally, at least one study found that the bereavement following a suicide can last at least a year and that many survivors are initially reluctant to seek assistance. These researchers emphasized the need for repeated offering of assistance (Provini, Everett, & Pfeffer, 2000) . The living arrangements of a deployed military unit offer both unique problems and unique opportunities for postvention following a suicide. There is relatively easy access to all members of a deployed military unit in order to conduct repeated, longitudinal outreach or psychoeducational programs. However, the unit's mission is the top priority, and interventions will need to maximize their assistance to military personnel while having minimal impact on mission engagement. Future research will need to develop programs and best practices that fit the circumstances of a combat environment, while also addressing the longitudinal concerns of soldiers after they return home.
Even while strategies are developed for intervention with military units in a combat zone, there must remain a focus on helping the individual soldier and mental health care provider deal with the suicide of a fellow soldier. Some authors have argued that suicide bereavement is not simply a unique form of grief, but a combination of grief and trauma (Callahan, 2000) . Events depicted in this case seem to support that idea. For instance, the two soldiers who responded first to the noise of the weapon acutely experienced flashbacks and hyperarousal. Even four months after the suicide, the soldier who sought help with his dreams and guilt illustrates that the sudden loss of a friend can be traumatic. His dreams in which he repeatedly failed to understand his friend are similar to what has been described as survivors dreaming about dead loved ones due to unfinished business (Fielden, 2003) . Similarly, the suicide left me second-guessing my own treatment of the dead soldier. In a circumstance that can occur in a remote military setting, I found myself treating the friend of my deceased patient, as he too wrestled with feelings of what he might have done to prevent the loss.
In conclusion, to my knowledge this is the first report in the literature concerning the effects of a suicide on an American military unit deployed to a combat zone. It describes the acute repercussions and effects over the subsequent four months of the event for members of his unit, other soldiers, the medical team who attempted to resuscitate him, and the mental health care providers on base. Future research is needed in several areas, including the effects of a suicide on the survivors in a military setting and best practices for postvention strategies to help them deal with the loss. Such research will need to take into account the unique circumstances of a military environment in a combat zone and also the longitudinal needs of military personnel after they return home. Andriessen, K., Beautrais, A., Grad, O. T., Brockmann, E., & Simkin, S. (2007) . Current understandings of suicide survivor issues: Research, practice, and plans. Report of the 1st International Suicide Postvention Seminar, September 8, 2006, Portoroz, Slovenia. Crisis, 28, 211-213. 
